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Abstract 
‘Medically Unexplained Symptoms’ (MUS) is a term referring to chronic physical symptoms 
for which no clear medical cause can be identified, and which lead to significant levels of 
psychological distress and functional impairment. Research has suggested that MUS can 
strongly influence construing of aspects of self and others. However, research which 
systematically explores construing of embodied aspects of self in relation to self more generally 
has not been undertaken with this population. This project modified the repertory grid 
technique, a tool from Personal Construct Psychology, to systematically explore how 
individuals experiencing MUS construe self and others in both bodily and psychological ways. 
Twenty participants experiencing various MUS completed repertory grid interviews and 
measures of symptoms of anxiety, depression and symptom impact. Findings suggested that 
symptoms are well integrated within participants’ wider mind-body construct systems. 
Increased distance between how self in general is construed compared to construing of self 
when symptoms are worst was associated with reduced symptoms of anxiety. Implicative 
dilemmas of an intrapersonal and ‘interpersonal’ nature were also measured and classified, 
the findings of which partly-supported previous suggestions that construing of moral and 
relational aspects of identity is particularly affected by MUS. The modified repertory grid is 
recommended as a potential tool for facilitating integrated formulation and the therapeutic 
reconstruction of mind-body identity for those experiencing MUS. 
 ‘Medically unexplained symptoms’ (MUS) is a term referring to physical symptoms 
which persist over time despite attempts at treatment, and for which a clear medical cause 
cannot be identified. These symptoms are associated with significant levels of psychological 
distress (Edwards, Stern, Clarke, et al., 2010), distorted cognitions about symptoms (Payne, 
2009) and functional impairment (Payne & Stott, 2010). MUS are thought to be highly 
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prevalent across primary and secondary care (Kroenke, 2003), and mainstream health services 
generally lack an integrated treatment pathway that can support comorbid psychological and 
physical needs of people who experience MUS (Joint Commissioning Panel for Mental 
Health/JCPMH, 2016). 
 Research with various forms of MUS has emphasized various ways in which identity is 
threatened by symptoms (Morley & Eccleston, 2004), such as the loss of a former ‘healthy’ self 
(Hellstroem, 2001; Whitehead, 2006), ‘enmeshment’ of symptoms with both undesirable 
(Asbring, 2001; Morley, Davies & Barton, 2005; Pincus & Morley, 2001; Sutherland & 
Morley, 2008) and desirable (Compan et al., 2010; Lilleas & Von Der Fehr, 2011) aspects of 
self, and alienation/splitting of the body from the self (Asbring, 2001; Miles et al., 2005; Smith 
& Osborn, 2006, 2007).  
 While such research into identity and MUS has appreciated that the body is important 
to identity, no research has yet attempted to explore systematically how the way the body is 
construed relates to how the self is construed more generally. Given the empirical and 
theoretical literature suggesting that MUS may develop in childhood in response to adversity 
and attachment difficulties with caregivers (e.g. Anderson, Elkit & Brink, 2013; Crittenden, 
2006; Kozlowska, 2007; Roelofs & Spinhoven, 2007; Waldinger et al., 2006), the aspects of 
self and identity which may be threatened in MUS may be those which are embodied and not 
readily verbalizable.  
 According to Personal Construct Theory (PCT, Kelly, 1955), individuals are constantly 
dynamically mapping and organizing their experience, developing systems of bipolar 
constructs for drawing distinctions in their experiences. This system contains ‘core’ constructs 
which are superordinate, relating to many other constructs in the system (e.g. those relating to 
how self and others are construed, e.g. “compassionate-cruel”), and constructs which are more 
peripheral (e.g. “likes jazz-does not like jazz”). Some constructs within a person’s system may 
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form at a preverbal stage (Leitner, 1999), being structured primarily by embodied interactions 
with others and the world (Butt, 2004; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Such ‘embodied constructs’ 
may be core to how the self is construed, despite having never been verbalized and at lower 
levels of awareness (Caldwell, 2014; Erskine, 2014; Kelly, 1963).  
 Situations which threaten the sense of self may be difficult to verbalize if they involve 
such embodied constructs – so while the person experiences the distress associated with such 
threat to self (Kelly, 1955), he or she may only be able to comprehend and respond to such 
threats at a preverbal, embodied level (Cipolletta & Pruneddu, 2012; Obissier, 2006), in the 
absence of verbal elaboration of the nature of the threat (Chiari & Nuzzo, 2004; Winter, 2003). 
The person’s construing of identity is ‘frozen’ (Leitner, 1999) to reconstructive change, so 
threats continue to be managed in a limited way (Lin & Payne, 2014). It may therefore be 
important to give language to constructs about bodily aspects of self and connect them with 
more elaborated, verbal systems for making sense of self and others (Lin & Payne, 2014) in 
order to formulate psychological distress and embodied experience in terms of threats to 
identity, and facilitate the reconstructive process (Kelly, 1969). 
 The present research paper attempted to develop the repertory grid technique (Kelly, 
1955) to explore links between how the body and symptoms are construed in relation to ways 
of construing self and others more broadly. Repertory grids are a too  which have been 
traditionally used to make a person’s construct system explicit, and systematically explore 
relationships between constructs (Fransella & Bannister, 2003). They have been used in 
research with chronic pain and Irritable Bowel Syndrome (IBS), exploring links between how 
symptoms are construed and other aspects of self-construing (Benasayag et al, 2004; Compan 
et al., 2011, Drysdale, 1989; Large, 1985), and constructs relating to coping styles (Large & 
Strong, 1997). While grids have been adapted to explore construing of the body in conditions 
such as cancer (Turpin, Dallos, Owen & Thomas, 2009; Weber et al., 2005), and eating 
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disorders (Borkenhagen et al., 2005; Dada et al., 2017), no study has yet done this for people 
who experience MUS.  
 The current research aimed to explore the following aspects of self-construing: 
(i) Integration of the symptom within the main construct system for mind body identity: 
 This study hypothesised that if constructs concerning the symptoms are dissociated from the 
more general construct system for making sense of self and others (Lin & Payne, 2014), then 
this would be associated with increased levels of anxiety, as the symptom construct is less 
effective in making meaningful predictions about self and others. At the other extreme, if 
symptoms are superordinate and dominate a person’s identity construct system (a form of 
‘enmeshment’ (Pincus & Morley, 2001)), this may also be associated with increased anxiety. 
 
(ii) Implicative dilemmas in how the embodied self is construed in relation to the wider self: 
Research by Compan et al. (2011) identified ‘implicative dilemmas’ (Feixas & Saúl, 2005) as a 
key characteristic differentiating a clinical sample of women with fibromyalgia from a non-
clinical pain sample. An implicative dilemma represents a ‘cognitive conflict’ in which a 
construct pole representing the symptom (or another undesired aspect of identity) is associated 
with the pole of a core construct representing a valued or desirable aspects of the person’s 
current identity. The desired change in the symptom or other undesired aspect of identity is 
associated with undesired change in another aspect of core identity, presenting the person with 
a dilemma. The content of the verbal constructs that are involved in these dilemmas can be 
categorized to identify which aspects of identity would be threatened by symptom changes. For 
example, Compan et al. (2011) identified a number of ‘moral’ and ‘relational’ constructs that 
formed implicative dilemmas with pain constructs. The current research aimed to use 
additional bodily constructs to elaborate and enrich these dilemmas to explore how they might 
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reflect preverbal, implicit conflicts. 
 
(iii) Distances between how the self is construed across different contexts. Self-discrepancy 
theory (Higgins, 1987) would predict that perceived differences between how the self is 
currently seen and the ideal self would be associated with experiences of depression (e.g. 
Waters et al., 2004). This study is additionally interested in differences in how the self is 
currently construed relative to how the self is construed before symptoms, and how the self in 
general is construed relative to times when symptoms are worst, as potential predictors of 
levels of psychological distress. 
 
(iv) Patterns in how the self is experienced directly, and how the self is construed from the 
perspective of significant others: A number of papers suggest that the way the self is perceived 
publicly and in terms of interpersonal constructs (Drysdale, 1989; Kindermans et al., 2011) is 
highly important with various MUS (Kindermans et al., 2010; Miles et al., 2005). In addition to 
exploring how the current self and ideal self are construed, this study aimed to explore how 
people with MUS construe how other people perceive them, and how they would like other 
people to perceive them. 
Hypotheses 
 
1a. Constructs pertaining to symptoms will be dissociated from the person’s main construct 
systems of mind and bodily identity. 
1b. Extremes of dissociation (low interconnectedness with other constructs in the constructs) 
or enmeshment (high interconnectedness with other constructs) will be associated with 
increased levels of anxiety and depression. 
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2a. Increased difference between how the self is construed relative to how the ideal self is 
construed will be positively correlated with symptoms of depression. 
2b. Increased difference between how the self is currently construed relative to self before the 
onset of symptoms will be positively correlated with depression symptoms 
2c. Increased difference between how the self is construed before the onset of symptoms 
compared to how the self is ideally construed will be positively correlated with symptoms of 
anxiety and depression. 
2d. Increased difference between how the self is construed currently compared to how the self 
is construed when symptoms are at their worst will be negatively correlated with symptoms of 
anxiety and depression.   
2e. The difference between how the current self is construed compared to the ideal self will be 
greater than the difference between how the self is currently construed as being seen by others 
compared to how the self is construed as being ideally seen by others. 
3a. Intrapersonal and interpersonal implicative dilemmas will be associated with movement of 
discrepant physical and symptom constructs towards the desired pole 
3b. Intrapersonal and interpersonal dilemmas will be more likely than expected to involve 
congruent constructs relating to moral and relational characteristics. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty participants were recruited from online support groups, forums and social media sites. 
No incentives were used other than the opportunity to contribute to current understanding of an 
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under-researched area.  Inclusion criteria included: experiencing a physical symptom that had 
been present for 6 months or more; negative results of tests/investigations, symptoms leading 
to impairment of everyday functioning and distress; over 18 years old; and English speaking. 
Exclusion criteria included: a primary diagnosis of a psychiatric condition (e.g. major 
depressive disorder, psychosis, personality disorder) and/or currently receiving care within 
secondary mental healthcare services; current substance misuse; experience of trauma or 
significant bereavement during the past 6 months; non-English speaking; diagnosis of learning 
disability. 
Eighteen women and two men aged between 25 and 71 years took part in the study. Two 
potential participants were excluded on the grounds of (i) trauma experience during the past 6 
months relating to MUS experience; (ii) primary diagnosis of major psychiatric condition 
respectively. The sample included various forms of chronic pain including specific joint and 
low back pain (4), widespread fibromyalgia pain (8), fatigue (5) and neurological symptoms (3) 
such as migraines and unexpected loss of balance. All participants had been experiencing 
symptoms for at least 1 year (mean 9.01 years, SD= 6.94), and several participants reported 
having more than one MUS. None of the participants were currently engaged with mental 
health services; however, the sample was characterized by the full-range of clinically-defined 
categories of symptoms of anxiety and depression for the PHQ-9 and GAD-7. The majority 
(12) named General Practitioners (GP) as their main form of support. Several participants (4) 
reported self-managing symptoms (visiting GPs <5 times per year) and the remainder (4) 
described their main support as being provided by specialist or multidisciplinary outpatient 
services. Half of the sample were in full or part time employment, with the remainder being 
retired (3) or unemployed (7).  
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Power calculations were made to determine the sample size required for demonstrating effect 
sizes with adequate power (AICBT Ltd, 2017). For the correlational analyses, a sample of 28 
participants would be required for detecting a strong positive correlation (r≤0.5) with desired 
power (0.8) at the 95% significance level. However, given the recruitment difficulties and time 
constraints, as a practical compromise the sample size was 20 participants. This gives a 6% 
increase in alpha-error level for detecting a strong correlation at a borderline level of 
significance (p<0.10). For chi-squared analyses, this increase in alpha-error level was similar at 
borderline significance level. 
Instruments and Measures 
REPERTORY GRID TECHNIQUE (RGT) 
 Personal constructs were elicited using an adapted triadic method (Kelly, 1955). 
Participants were presented with three cards at a time with the names of various persons 
(known as ‘elements’) known to participants written on them. They were instructed to provide 
‘a way in which two are alike and different from the third’ in a physical/embodied way, and a 
psychological way. When participants provided a word or phrase that describes the similarity 
or difference (e.g. ‘generous’), they were asked to describe a person who they saw as being the 
opposite of that characteristic (e.g. ‘greedy’). This gives a word-pair representing a bipolar 
personal construct (‘generous---greedy’). The order in which the physical and psychological 
constructs were elicited for each pair was counterbalanced. A total of 6 psychological and 
physical constructs were elicited from the following elements: me as I am currently, how I 
would like to be, me when my symptoms are at their worst, me before symptoms began, a 
person I know and like, a person I know and do not like, significant people in my life (x4 
names). Following this, the person was provided with the MUS they had described (e.g. 
‘burning knee pain’) and asked to describe a person who they saw as being the opposite of that 
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(e.g. ‘walking freely’) – it was left open as to whether the participant construed the symptom 
contrast pole as physical or psychological. 
 Following elicitation, participants were presented with a numeric scale from 1 to 7 with 
each of the word pairs representing a pole of the construct they had provided. They were 
presented with each element they had rated, plus the following additional elements: my 
symptom if it were a person, how I think other people see me, how I would like other people to 
see me. Participants were asked to give a rating for each element on each construct. This 
produced a grid of ratings, which was analysed using the IDIOGRID (Grice, 2002) and 
GRIDSTAT (Bell, 2004) computer programmes to extract the following quantitative measures: 
Principal Components Analysis. Principal components analysis (PCA) analyses the variance of 
grid ratings into components, which represent constellations of constructs which correlate 
highly with one another, but less with constructs on other components. Components accounting 
for more variance are considered to represent more well-developed subsystems, being used to 
make more predictions than components with fewer constructs and accounting for less grid 
variance (the first principal component being the largest). This study replicates Metcalfe’s 
(1997) method with participants experienced agoraphobia, by recording the number of times on 
which the symptom construct loads on the first component compared to the next two largest 
components. If the symptom is more likely to load on components 2 and 3 than the first 
component than would be expected based on the loadings of other constructs, then this is 
evidence that the symptom construct is poorly integrated within the wider identity construct 
system. 
Intensity of symptom construct. Symptom construct intensity provides a continuous measure of 
the level of integration of the symptom construct within grids. It is calculated by summing the 
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squared values of correlations of the symptom construct with the rest of the constructs, then 
averaging by the total number of constructs minus one.  
Inter-element distances. Relationships between the ratings of different elements can be 
calculated as distances between elements in the ‘grid-space’, which are standardized according 
to all other inter-element differences within the grid (Grice, 2002). The standardized distances 
range between 0 and 2, where a distance of 0 indicates that elements are construed as being 
identical, distances ≤0.8 indicate similarity between elements, and distances ≥1.2 suggest 
dissimilarity between elements (Makhlouf-Norris & Norris, 1973).  
Implicative Dilemmas (self-defined and interpersonally-defined). Implicative dilemmas are 
counted when the desirable pole of a congruent construct (on which current self and ideal self 
are similarly rated) is correlated r>.35 with the undesirable pole of a discrepant construct (on 
which current self and ideal self are rated as different, marking the pole describing the current 
self as undesirable) (Feixas & Saúl, 2005). Such dilemmas were identified by the a version of 
IDIOGRID which uses a somewhat different criterion for identifying a congruent construct 
(self and ideal self on the same side of the midpoint) than in the Feixas & Saúl (2005) method 
(self and ideal self no more than one point different in ratings).  In this study, implicative 
dilemmas were also counted pertaining to how the current self as seen by others is construed 
relative to the self as ideally seen by others. No previous attempts to operationalize and 
measure such ‘interpersonal implicative dilemmas’ have been made to the authors’ knowledge. 
 The content of the constructs involved in implicative dilemmas can be semantically 
categorized (e.g. Compan et al., 2011). Psychological constructs were classified using the 
Classification System for Personal Constructs (CSPC) (Feixas, Geldschlager & Neimeyer, 
2002), which uses the following categories: operational, personal, relational, emotional, moral 
and values/interests. Physical constructs were classified using the following categories: 
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aesthetic appearance, weight, strength, age, energy/dynamism, health function, gender and 
emotions – largely based on the content analysis of body constructs for people with cancer 
(Segura-Valverde, Saúl & Baca-Garcia, 2017). 
MEASURE YOURSELF MEDICAL OUTCOMES PROFILE (MYMOP-2) 
 The MYMOP-2 (Paterson, 1996) is a symptom-focussed, patient-generated instrument 
which requires the individual to specify at least one symptom and one valued activity that the 
symptom interferes with. Participants rate the symptom on a 7-point scale (0= ‘as good as it 
could be’; 6= ‘As bad as it could be’). Questions on general wellbeing and coping strategies are 
similarly scaled. Three subscales and an overall symptom impact score are produced. This tool 
has been used in primary care settings, and with MUS (e.g. Payne & Brooks, 2016).  
GENERAL ANXIETY DISORDER (GAD-7) 
 The GAD-7 (Spitzer et al., 2006) is a structured 7-item questionnaire tool on self-
reported symptoms of anxiety over the past 2 weeks. It is widely used as a screening tool for 
anxiety disorders in primary care settings (Lowe et al., 2008) and has been used in research 
with MUS populations (Payne & Brooks, 2016). 
PATIENT HEALTH QUESTIONNAIRE (PHQ-9) 
 The PHQ-9 is a structured 9-item tool on self-reported symptoms of low mood and 
depression over the past 2 weeks. Like the GAD-7, it is widely used in primary care settings 
and has been used with MUS populations (Payne & Brooks, 2016). 
Procedure 
Participants were given information sheets electronically, and provided written consent prior to 
interviews. Interviews were conducted either in person or via tele-conferencing software 
(Skype), and lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. Participants provided key demographic 
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information, followed by completion of the MYMOP, PHQ-9 and GAD-7 with the guidance of 
the researcher. Following this, participants completed the Repertory Grid interview as 
described above.  
Results 
Symptom construct integration 
Symptom constructs were not significantly more likely to load on the peripheral components, 
and indeed showed a tendency to load slightly (though not significantly) more than would be 
expected on the largest component ( χ2(2,20)=2.21, p=.33, one-tailed). A Jonkcheere-Terpstra 
test for ordered alternatives indicated a significant trend of increased median intensity for 
symptom constructs (Mdn=.71, IQR=.23) over physical (Mdn=.68, IQR=.19) and 
psychological (Mdn=.64, IQR=.23) constructs (TJT= 10881, z= 2.042, p= .04, one-tailed). The 
correlation between symptom construct intensity (M= .69, SD=.10) and PHQ-9 scores was 
negative and not significant (r(19)= -.40, p= .07, one-tailed). Symptom construct intensity 
significantly negatively correlated with GAD-7 scores (r= -.39, p= .05, one-tailed). A 
curvilinear relationship hypothesised (1b) between GAD-7 scores and symptom intensity was 
not significant (r=-.36, p=.06, one-tailed) and did not add significant predictive value to the 
linear negative relationship between GAD-7 scores and symptom intensity when entered into a 
multiple regression model (∆F=1.31, p=.29). 
Inter-element distances 
Mean distance between current self and ideal self (1.15, SD= .19) was close to 1.2, indicating 
dissimilarity in how these elements were perceived. Distance between current self and ideal 
self did not significantly positively correlate with PHQ-9 scores as predicted (r= .24 p= .16, 
one-tailed). However, distances between the current self and the ideal self were significantly 
positively correlated with GAD-7 scores (r(20)= .39, p= .05, one-tailed). Mean distance 
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between current self and self when symptoms are worst was .77 (SD=.25), indicating that 
participants tended to regard these elements as somewhat similar. After removing one outlier 
who appeared to dissociate their current self from self when symptoms are worst (distance = 
1.25), a significant negative correlation was found between distance between current self and 
self when symptoms are worst and PHQ-9 scores (r(19)= -.48, p=.02, one-tailed). The mean 
distance between the current self  and the self before symptoms was .91 (SD=.29), indicating 
that participants perceived themselves to be different people as the result of experiencing 
symptoms, but not to the extent that they perceived themselves as completely dissimilar to the 
way that they construed themselves before symptom onset. The distance between the ideal self 
and the self before symptoms (M=.43, SD=.26) was significantly positively correlated with 
GAD-7 scores (r(20)= .55, p=.01, one-tailed) but was not significantly positively correlated 
with PHQ-9 scores (r(19)= -.37, p=.06, one-tailed). 
 The distance between current self and ideal self (Mdn=1.25, IQR=.3Z) was 
significantly greater than the distance between the self as currently seen by others and the self 
as ideally seen by others (Mdn=.73, IQR=.41) (Z=.37, p<.01, one-tailed). The difference 
between the distance between current self and ideal self, and current self as seen by others and 
self as ideally seen by others (MD=.32, SD=.22) was significantly positively correlated with 
PHQ-9 scores (r(20)=.49, p=.03, one-tailed), as was the distance between the ideal self and the 
self as ideally seen by others (Mdn=.28, IQR= .46) (r(20)= .53, p=.02, one-tailed). 
 Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted to explore the relative 
predictive value of the inter-element measures correlating with the GAD-7 and PHQ-9 
respectively (no variables significantly correlated with MYMOP-2 scores) (Table 1). For the 
GAD-7, the distance between current self and ideal self no longer added predictive value 
(∆F=.06, p=.81), whereas a model which included both (i) the distance between current self 
and self when symptoms are worst, and (ii) distance between self before symptoms and ideal 
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self had the highest predictive value of GAD-7 scores (∆F(2,19), 7.17, p=.01). Of the PHQ-9 
variables, the distance between the ideal self and the self as ideally seen by others no longer 
added significant predictive value (∆F=4.20, p= .21). A combined model of (i) distance 
between current self and self when symptoms are worst and (ii) difference between distance 
between current self and ideal self and self as currently seen by others  and self as ideally seen 
by others  was most significantly predictive of PHQ-9 scores (F(2,19)=5.28, p=.02). 
 
Implicative dilemmas 
 Less than half of the sample (n=8) had implicative dilemmas relating to congruent 
psychological constructs and incongruent physical or symptom constructs in their grids. Four 
participants had “interpersonal” dilemmas relating to the self as seen by other and ideal self as 
seen by others, one participant had an “intrapersonal” dilemma relating to the current self in 
relation to the ideal self, and three participants had overlapping dilemmas where the same 
dilemmas existed both intrapersonally and interpersonally. A chi-square test revealed that there 
were significant differences in the CPSC content category for congruent constructs in 
dilemmas compared to what would be expected from the distribution of all constructs across 
CSPC categories ( χ2(5,20)=13.31, p=.021, two-tailed). The observed number of congruent 
constructs classified as ‘moral’ and ‘relational’ was notably greater than expected (Table 2). 
When the test was repeated using the physical constructs correlating most highly with 
congruent psychological constructs, there were significant differences in the categorization of 
these physical constructs as compared to what would be expected based on the distributions of 
all physical constructs into categories (χ2(1,162)=20.55, p=.02, two-tailed). Bodily constructs 
relating to gender (typically being ‘female’ as opposed to ‘male’) were notably more likely 
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than expected (expected count = 0.5, actual count = 3) to correlate most with congruent 
physical constructs, and they also correlated with congruent moral and relational constructs. 
  
Discussion 
 Attempts to theoretically formulate and treat MUS are frequently hamstrung by the tacit 
assumption that ‘mind’ and ‘body’ are in reality separate entities, which can lead to the 
‘psychologization’ (Crane & Patterson, 2012) of symptoms, which invalidates the inherently 
embodied experiences of those with MUS (Edwards et al., 2010; Salmon, Ring, Dowrick & 
Humphris, 2005); or alternatively, reduces the body to a passive mechanistic object in the 
search for medical causes, leading to a ‘dead-end’ in the process of finding meaning for 
symptoms when no substantial causes can be identified (Nettleton et al., 2005). The Repertory 
Grid method used in this study could be regarded as a tool for exploring mind and body 
identity in an integrated way for people with MUS, one that listens to the meaning a person 
gives to their body, connecting it to their broader personhood in a manner which is less 
stigmatizing and driven by dualistic assumptions. 
 In the current sample, it appears that symptom constructs were well integrated within 
the mind body construct systems of participants, tending (though not significantly) towards the 
phenomenon of ‘enmeshment’ of symptoms with psychological and physical ways of 
construing self and others (Pincus & Morley, 2001). Increased interconnectedness of symptom 
construct with other constructs for identity was found to be associated with decreased anxiety 
symptoms, presumably because this allows more predictions to be made about self and others 
based on symptoms.  
 The way in which the self in general is perceived relative to times when symptoms are 
worst appeared to be particularly important for participants, perhaps more so than the 
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difference between how the current self is construed in comparison to the ideal self and the self 
before onset of symptoms respectively. Perceiving a dissimilarity between self in general and 
self when symptoms are worst reduced anxiety, and the fact that this discrepancy did not 
correlate with symptom severity scores suggests that it is the perceived difference, rather than 
the absolute difference made by symptoms, that has this effect on anxiety. This appears to 
support an enmeshment-based formulation of MUS: If a number of undesirable characteristics 
are enmeshed with symptoms, construing these negative differences as residing more in the self 
when symptoms are at their worst than the self in general may serve to protect from construing 
the self as having globally changed in undesirable ways (Hellstroem, 2001).  
 While there was evidenc  that perceived dissimilarity between self and ideal self was 
correlated with anxiety, the perceived distance between the self prior to symptoms and the ideal 
self had stronger predictive value of anxiety experience. This latter finding appears to support 
research which suggests that prior to experiencing symptoms, people with MUS may have high 
and difficult to achieve standards for themselves (Ayats, Martin & Soler, 2006; Compan et al., 
2011; Hallberg & Carlsson, 2011), rather than the increased distance between self and ideals 
due to MUS being a primary contributor to psychological distress.  
 As expected, the discrepancy between the current self and the ideal self was greater 
than the discrepancy between the self as seen by others and the self as ideally seen by others. 
This might be taken as evidence of ‘subversion’ (Miles et al., 2005) and processes whereby 
people try to maintain their public identity by avoiding social situations when symptomatic, or 
by ‘pushing through symptoms’ to maintain a public identity (Hellstroem, 2001; Kindermans et 
al., 2011). Increased difference between these perceived discrepancies was associated with 
increased depression symptoms, even after factoring in additional predictors of depression. The 
fact that the difference in discrepancies had greater explanatory power for depression 
symptoms than the discrepancy between the respective ideals (i.e. ideal self and self as ideally 
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seen by others) suggests that increased depression scores may not be related specifically to 
experiencing guilt and/or shame about having different and possibly conflicting ideals. Rather, 
it could reflect more of a sense of hopelessness about achieving both sets of ideals (whether 
overlapping or distinct) whilst also experiencing symptoms.   
 For a number of participants the construct ‘strong-weak’ appeared to have a high 
intensity in the overall construct system, and these participants also tended to use psychological 
constructs akin to ideas of mental strength and weakness, such as ‘determined-lazy’ 
(psychological for this participant) or ‘resilient-fragile’ (physical for this participant). This 
merits further exploration, as it possibly suggests a rather rigid and less-compassionate 
(‘nonvalidating’, Walker, 2002) way of relating to psychological and/or physical forms of 
vulnerability. This sub-finding resembles the construing of self by people who experience 
forms of chronic pain as ‘emotionally strong’ (Werner et al., 2004) ‘independent’ and ‘stoically 
coping’ (Large & Strong, 1997). During the interviews, several participants asked to be 
reminded whether ‘Strong-Weak’ was a physical or psychological construct during the ratings 
procedure, suggesting that they would give very different ratings for elements depending on the 
psychological or physical nature of this construct. Using the repertory grid method where ‘my 
mind’ and ‘my body’ are construed as separate elements, perhaps with ‘strong-weak’ as a 
supplied construct could potentially be used to explore different ways of construing strength 
and weakness of mental and bodily nature with people who experience MUS. 
  The presence of implicative dilemmas relating to symptoms was neither a 
ubiquitous or distinctive characteristic of the current sample. For those with interpersonal 
and/or intrapersonal implicative dilemmas, the content of these dilemmas was significantly 
more likely to involve congruent relational constructs (as Compan et al., 2011 found), and 
some of the physical constructs involved in dilemmas appeared to elaborate relational aspects 
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of self (e.g. being seen as ‘heavy-burdened’, ‘stiff-unreliable’ and ‘weak-empathic’). For 
example, one participant experiencing chronic fatigue construed being more ‘energetic’ (as 
opposed to wiped out) and ‘alert’ (as opposed to dozey) as having the implication of being (and 
being regarded by other people as being) more ‘irresponsible’ (as opposed to 
‘steady/responsible’) and ‘having wanderlust’ (as opposed to being ‘family oriented’). These 
relational and moral congruent constructs in dilemmas were generally part of less elaborated 
and more peripheral subsystems suggesting that such aspects of identity are not well 
understood in terms of the main construct system for mind-body identity (Metcalfe, 1997), 
possibly in lower levels of awareness (Compan et al., 2011; Koch et al., 2013; Leitner, 1999; 
Lilleas & Von Der Fehr, 2011). The constructs involved hint at the implicit but valued identity 
of ‘sensitivity to others’ suggested by Drysdale (1989) with chronic low back pain participants. 
The association between congruent aspects of relational or moral identity and physical 
constructs relating to the female gender/sex found for several participants in this study also 
resembles the female habitus of a ‘bodily state of preparedness for others’ proposed by Lilleas 
& Von der Fehr (2011) with women experiencing fibromyalgia. The quality in the content of 
construing of the bodily self in such dilemmas is suggestive of concrete, embodied metaphor 
that elaborates a more complex interpersonal identity (Caldwell, 2014; Centomo & Del Rizzo, 
2016; Erskine, 2014). The fact for a number of participants interpersonal dilemmas existed 
both exclusively from, and in addition to, intrapersonal dilemmas, is further suggestive of the 
relational nature of these dilemmas for participants, suggesting that the measurement of 
interpersonally-defined implicative dilemmas could be fruitful in researching human 
difficulties from an interpersonal or relational frame. This possibility will be discussed further 
in an additional paper based on this research, and merits further exploration.  
 The current study has a number of limitations. Notably, the number of participants 
recruited substantially limits the statistical power of the findings, which would need to be 
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substantiated with a larger sample size. The fact that these participants were recruited through 
social media may limit the generalization of these findings to clinical settings, though on the 
other hand it may be argued that recruiting via social media led to the inclusion of participants 
who prefer not to use mainstream services due to perceived stigma (Raine et al., 2002). One 
encouraging feature of this study is that the use of Skype interviews which made the interview 
process more flexible and more accessible to participants whose physical needs may have made 
face to face interviews more difficult. The adaptations of the repertory grid technique for use 
with Skype are not documented elsewhere to the researchers’ knowledged, and may be the 
subject of an additional publication.  
 Another limitation concerns the data used to correlate with grid measures. Although the 
repertory grids yielded a rich amount of idiographic data, the questionnaire tools (MYMOP, 
PHQ-9 and GAD-7) were selected on the basis of their wide application in primary care 
settings, and to reduce the physical demands on participants whose symptoms may make 
engaging in research more difficult. The disadvantage of using such tools was that they do not 
provide a comprehensive or comparatively rich source of information alongside the repertory 
grid measures. Based on some of the data from this study, a tool which examines aspects of 
social functioning alongside clinical measures of anxiety and depression might be fruitful. 
 In sum, for many participants, symptoms appear to be well-integrated, and perhaps 
superordinate in their construing of identity, and being able to perceive a difference between 
times when symptoms are worst and a general sense of self may be important in ensuring that 
symptoms do not become ‘enmeshed’ with identity. The discrepancies between public self and 
ideals, the presence of interpersonal implicative dilemmas, and the content of implicative 
dilemmas all hint towards the idea that symptoms may particularly influence how the self is 
viewed relationally and interpersonally.  Using tools such as the repertory grid can facilitate the 
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process of giving language to and raising awareness of the body, facilitating integrated, non-
dualistic assessment and encouraging a collaborative reconstructive process. 
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Table 1 
Hierarchical regression analysis of repertory grid standardized euclidean distances 
correlating with GAD-7 and PHQ-9 scores 
Dependent 
Variable 
Block Independent 
Variable 
Pearson r 
(with all 
IVs) 
∆R2 ∆F Sig. ∆F 
PHQ-9 1 Distance 
between current 
self and self 
when symptoms 
are worst 
-.44 .145 4.21 .06 
2 Difference 
between 
distance 
between current 
self and ideal 
self, and current 
self as seen by 
others, and ideal 
self as seen by 
others 
.49 .311 5.28 .03 
3 [ideal-self] – 
[ideally-seen-as] 
discrepancy 
.43 .34 4.20 .21 
GAD-7 1 Distance 
between pre 
symptom self 
and current self 
-.55 .30 7.61 .01 
2 Distance 
between current 
self and self 
when symptoms 
are worst 
-.36 .16 5.03 .04 
3 Distance 
between current 
self and ideal 
self 
.39 .00 0.06 .81 
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Table 2 
 
Observed and expected number of constructs for each category of the Classification System for 
Personal Constructs (CSPC), for congruent constructs in implicative dilemmas versus 
psychological constructs not involved in implicative dilemmas 
 
Classification 
System for 
Personal 
Constructs 
Category 
 Congruent Implicative 
Dilemma constructs 
All psychological constructs 
Moral Observed 3 6 
Expected 0.9 8.1 
Emotional Observed 1 38 
Expected 3.8 35.2 
Relational Observed 10 55 
Expected 6.3 58.7 
Personal Observed 1 14 
Expected 1.5 13.5 
Operational Observed 0 19 
Expected 1.9 17.1 
Values & 
Interests 
Observed 0 6 
Expected 0.7 6.3 
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